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E MERGENCIES
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P

UBLIC awareness of the use of restraints in
medicine has been greatly heightened by a fivepart investigative series on physical restraints in
psychiatric hospitals by the Hartford Courant and
reaction to it by Connecticut’s U.S. senators, Joseph
Lieberman and Christopher Dodd.1 In October 1998
the Courant’s 50-state survey identified 142 patients
who had died while in restraints or seclusion in the
past decade, and the total number is probably much
higher.2 The newspaper advocated the need for national standards for the use of restraints, impartial
oversight, and accountability “for behavior that is
cruel and even criminal.”1 The use of restraints for
patients in nursing homes has long been seen as
problematic, but concern about their use for patients
in general hospitals and psychiatric hospitals had
less illumination.3-8 New federal regulations should
change this.
FEDERAL REGULATIONS REGARDING
RESTRAINTS

Work on new federal standards for patients’ rights
in the Medicaid and Medicare programs, including
standards for the use of restraints, had been under
way before the Hartford Courant series but was accelerated because of it.9 The new federal regulations,
which were announced in July 1999 and which apply to all patients in hospitals that participate in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, include the following standard for the use of “restraint for acute
medical and surgical care”:
(1) The patient has the right to be free from restraints of
any form that are not medically necessary or are used as a
means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation
by staff. . . . (2) A restraint can only be used if needed
to improve the patient’s well-being and less restrictive interventions have been determined to be ineffective. . . .
(3) The use of restraint must be . . . in accordance with
the order of a physician or other licensed independent practitioner [and] . . . never written as a standing [or as needed] order. . . . (4) The condition of the restrained patient
must be continually assessed, monitored, and reevaluated.9
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There is a separate standard for the use of seclusion and restraints for behavior management. (Seclusion is not allowed at all under the standard for
medical care.) This standard resembles the medical
and surgical standard but is stricter, including provisions that “seclusion or restraint can only be used in
emergency situations if needed to ensure the patient’s
physical safety and less restrictive interventions have
been determined to be ineffective,” that a “physician
or other licensed independent practitioner must see
[the patient] and evaluate the need for restraint or
seclusion within 1 hour after the initiation of this intervention,” and that orders must be written and
must be “limited to [a period of ] 4 hours for adults;
2 hours for children and adolescents ages 9 to 17 or
1 hour for patients under 9.” Once the original order expires, a physician (or licensed independent practitioner, if permitted by state law) must see and assess the patient before a new order can be issued.9
Physical restraints include both mechanical devices and drugs used to “control behavior or to restrict
the patient’s freedom of movement.”9 Staff members
must be educated and trained in their use, and hospitals must report any deaths that occur while a patient is restrained or in seclusion to the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA).9 The American
Hospital Association had been on record as favoring
putting “systems in place to prevent these deaths.”10
The association, however, immediately went to court
to enjoin enforcement of the regulations on restraints
and seclusion, primarily on the basis that implementation would require additional staffing, especially
with respect to the rule that patients who are restrained for behavior management must be seen by
a physician within one hour.11 According to the American Hospital Association, hospitals would prefer to
have physicians call in behavior-management orders
and do not believe that physicians could be induced
to come into the hospital in the middle of the night
to perform the assessment as required by the regulations. The association’s petition was properly rejected by U.S. District Court Judge Gladys Kessler.12
Nonetheless, there are problems with the new rules.
The central one, I think, is that the rules do not make
it clear enough that competent patients have a right
to refuse any medical treatment and that the use of
restraints can never be justified as a means of forcing
treatment on a competent patient who is refusing
treatment. A case decided in the spring of 1999 by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which is
not referred to in the new regulations, illustrates this
and related issues.7
RESTRAINTS IN THE EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENT

The facts of the case were summarized by the court
as follows. Catherine Shine, the 29-year-old daughter of a physician, suffered a severe asthma attack on
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a Sunday morning in March 1990 while at her sister
Anna’s apartment (like the court, I use first names
to distinguish the sisters). Catherine had had asthma
most of her life and was well informed about her illness, which had been controlled by medication. Her
attacks were characterized by a rapid onset and rapid
remission. She had never required intubation.13
Anna suggested that they go to Massachusetts General Hospital. Catherine agreed, but only if her treatment would be limited to the administration of oxygen. Anna called the hospital and was assured that
Catherine would be treated only with oxygen. They
went to the emergency department at 7 a.m., where
Catherine was given oxygen and medication through
a nebulizer. Catherine soon removed the nebulizer,
reporting that the medication gave her a headache,
and said she wanted to leave the hospital. This behavior alarmed the treating nurse. Blood gas results,
obtained at about 7:30 a.m., showed that she was
“very sick.” Dr. José Vega, the only attending physician on duty in the emergency department that morning, examined Catherine and concluded that intubation was necessary. Catherine refused, and Vega agreed
to continue treatment with the oxygen mask.13 Anna
meanwhile telephoned their father, Dr. Ian Shine, in
England. Dr. Shine spoke with a physician and told
him that Catherine understood her illness well and
that he should listen to her and not treat her without her consent. Vega testified that he told Shine that
he had to intubate Catherine because she was “in
the midst of a severe asthma attack” and that Shine
asked him to wait until he flew to Boston before
attempting the intubation.13
When Anna returned to Catherine’s room, she saw
that her sister’s condition had improved somewhat.
Catherine was able to talk and breathe more easily,
but she was in a heated argument with the staff. At
about 7:40 a.m., when they were left alone for a moment, Catherine told Anna to “run”; they ran down
the corridor to an exit door, where they were forcibly apprehended by a physician and a security guard.
Catherine was returned to her room, and Vega immediately ordered her placed in four-point restraints.
Anna was removed from the room and not allowed
to speak with her sister or observe her treatment. At
approximately 8 a.m., new blood gas results indicated that Catherine’s condition had improved; Vega did
not read the new test results and testified that they
would not have affected his decision to intubate her
in any case.13
At approximately 8:25 a.m., forcible intubation
commenced. Catherine had been in four-point restraints for about 45 minutes. No one ever questioned
Catherine’s competence to consent to treatment, nor
was there any basis to question her competence. Catherine never consented to intubation, and Vega testified that he never discussed the risks and benefits of
intubation with Catherine, Anna, or their father. Cath-

erine’s condition subsequently improved, and she was
released from the hospital the following day.13
THE AFTERMATH OF EMERGENCY
TREATMENT

Evidence was presented at trial that Catherine had
been severely traumatized by her mistreatment at the
hospital. She had nightmares, cried constantly, was
unable to return to work for several months, became
obsessed about her medication, and swore repeatedly that she would never go to a hospital again. Approximately two years later, in July 1992, Catherine
had a severe asthma attack while at home with her
fiancé and her brother. She refused to be taken to the
hospital. Her brother, nonetheless, called an ambulance after she became unconscious, which transported her to a nearby hospital. After unsuccessful medical treatment, she died.
Her father, as administrator of her estate, brought
a multicount complaint against Vega and Massachusetts General Hospital, alleging, among other things,
negligence, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
and wrongful death. Her father’s primary contention, both at the trial and on appeal, was that Vega
wrongfully restrained and intubated Catherine without her consent. Vega and the hospital took the position that since Catherine had a life-threatening emergency, consent was not necessary.13 The trial judge,
Margaret R. Hinkley, mistakenly instructed the jury
that “under Massachusetts law a patient has the right
to refuse medical treatment except in an emergency,
life-threatening situation.”13 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts. Catherine’s father appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court
took the case directly, and all seven justices, in a unanimous decision, vacated the judgment and remanded
the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.13
THE DECISION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

The opinion, written by Justice Margaret Marshall, reviewed a number of the court’s own precedents, which held that both common law and constitutional law provide for the “right of a competent
individual to refuse medical treatment.”14,15 The court
had previously explained that the “right to bodily
integrity” had developed through the doctrine of
informed consent under which “a physician has the
duty to disclose to a competent adult sufficient information to enable the patient to make an informed
judgment whether to give or withhold consent to a
medical or surgical procedure.”14,15 The patient’s decision need not be a “wise” one, and the right to
refuse treatment includes the right to refuse “lifesaving procedures.”14-16
This opinion simply restates well-established law,
although the fact that the trial-court judge did not
know the law is disturbing. Appeals courts, however,
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exist to correct such errors. The defendants had argued that there is an exception to the informed-consent doctrine in the case of lifesaving treatment rendered in an emergency department, which includes
the use of restraints as part of treatment. The court
was sympathetic to emergency department physicians
but ruled that the need for quick action in an emergency cannot justify ignorance of the law or indifference to basic legal rights. In the words of the
court:
If the patient is competent, an emergency physician must
obtain her consent before providing treatment, even if the
physician is persuaded that, without the treatment, the patient’s life is threatened. If the patient’s consent cannot be
obtained because the patient is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting, the emergency physician should
seek the consent of a family member if time and circumstances permit.13

The court also quoted a standard law textbook that
summarizes the three basic requirements for emergency treatment without consent:
(a) The patient must be unconscious or without capacity
to make a decision, while no one legally authorized to act
as agent for the patient is available; (b) time must be of
the essence, in the sense that it must reasonably appear
that delay until such time as an effective consent could be
obtained would subject the patient to a risk of serious
bodily injury or death which prompt action would avoid;
and (c) under the circumstances, a reasonable person
would consent, and the probabilities are that the patient
would consent.13,16

The defendants did not contend that Catherine
was incompetent (i.e., not able to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of her decisions) but rather that after she was prevented from
leaving the hospital, she “became more confused and
combative, refusing treatment.” Her responses, however, were very reasonable in the light of the physician’s actions and were not evidence of incompetence. An assessment of competence in this case
required Catherine to answer only two questions:
Did she know what the physician wanted to do and
why? And did she know that she could die if the intervention was not performed?17,18 The answer to
both these questions was indisputably yes. Of course,
had it been determined that Catherine was incompetent, her sister and father would have had the authority to make decisions on her behalf consistent
with her directions, not the physician alone.
WOULD THE NEW RULES HAVE HELPED?

There was no legal or ethical justification for the
use of restraints in Catherine’s case. But would the
new federal regulations have helped, if they had been
in place at the time? The regulations first require a
determination of the reason for the use of restraints.
Was restraint proposed for “acute medical care” or
for “behavior management”? A case can be made for
1410 ·

both classifications, raising the question of which set
of regulations should have priority in a case like this
(or even whether both sets must be followed in a
mixed case). Because of the link between restraint
and intubation, the strongest argument is that the
restraint was used for the purpose of treatment. On
the other hand, restraint was also used as a means of
coercion — to prevent Catherine from leaving the
hospital. The regulations do not make it clear enough
that medical care is intended to promote the patient’s
overall well-being, whereas the goal of behavior management is only to prevent a patient from harming
himself or herself (such as by hitting his or her head
against a wall or attempting suicide) or from harming others. Behavior management is closer to a policing function. The patient’s primary protection against
the use of restraints under the new regulations is the
requirement of a physician’s order. This, of course,
offers no protection at all in a case in which the physician initiates the improper use of restraints.
Two other provisions might have helped Catherine. Four-point restraints are almost never the least
restrictive means available, and the regulations require that the use of a restraint must be “selected
only when other less restrictive measures have been
found to be ineffective to protect the patient or others from harm.”9 Following this rule would have required at least a rational explanation (i.e., a discussion of informed consent), followed by the use of
verbal threats and a show of physical intimidation
(neither of which is acceptable in this case, but both
of which would be “less restrictive”) before the actual use of physical restraints. The regulations also
require that the use of restraints be “ended at the
earliest possible time.” After Catherine’s second blood
gas test showed that her condition was improving,
neither treatment nor restraints were necessary. The
blood gas levels were not rechecked by the physician, but if the regulations had been followed, such
a reassessment would have been necessary, since the
regulations state that “the condition of the restrained
patient must be continually assessed, monitored, and
reevaluated.”9
As originally proposed, the rules included the
phrase that restraints could be “used only as a last
resort.”9 A number of commentators suggested that
this phrase be replaced with “when medically necessary.” As the Massachusetts case illustrates, however,
this phrase can make the decision to use restraints
seem like a medical one. Catherine’s physician might
have thought that his use of restraints was “medically necessary.” HCFA decided against the use of either phrase and instead replaced “as a last resort” with
the phrase “when other less restrictive measures have
been found to be ineffective.”9 I think this was a
mistake. HCFA was right not to see the use of restraints as a standard medical procedure, but the agency was wrong to back down. The overall point of the
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regulations is that restraints and seclusion are to be
used only if absolutely necessary, and the language
that best expresses this and alerts all staff members
that the use of restraints should be unusual is that
they should be used “only as a last resort.”
COMPETENT PATIENTS AND RESTRAINTS

The only justification for the use of restraints in an
emergency is to prevent patients from physically harming themselves or others, and even then they should
be used only for the shortest time possible and with
the least restriction possible. Even in the emergency
setting, competent adult patients retain the right to
refuse treatment. Coercive measures, including restraints and the threat of restraints, cannot be used
simply because a patient refuses treatment.
It is never appropriate to restrain a competent patient against his or her will solely because he or she
is refusing treatment recommended by a physician.
Neither the law nor the new federal regulations —
if they had been in effect — permitted the use of restraints in Catherine Shine’s case. It is, moreover, almost always the case in disputes between a physician
and a competent patient over a recommended treatment, even in an emergency, that the most effective
approach is to continue to discuss with the patient
the reasons for the recommendation, the alternatives, and the consequences of doing nothing. This
approach takes time, but there is no substitute. The
patient’s family is often useful in this situation, not because the family has any legal authority to consent
on behalf of a competent patient, but because they
might help the emergency physician understand the
patient and might also help the patient understand
the emergency physician.
It can also be very useful to contact the patient’s
primary care physician. On the other hand, communication by telephone can sometimes do more harm
than good — since neither the person at Massachusetts General Hospital who assured Anna that Catherine would get only oxygen nor her physician father, who was in England, could properly assess
Catherine’s condition over the telephone. This is
why the federal regulations properly insist on the actual presence of a physician. Continued discussion is
important because a patient who understands the
recommended intervention and its rationale is much
more likely to agree to it. A refusal under these circumstances is more likely to be an informed one as
well, and refusals as well as agreements to treatment
must be informed.19 Competent patients, however,
cannot be forced either to talk or to listen, and the
fact that they will not talk to the physician does not
by itself make them incompetent, any more than the
fact that they do not agree with the physician’s recommendation.
Catherine Shine, as a competent adult patient,
also had a legal right to leave the hospital at any time

she decided to leave. Hospitals are not prisons, and
patients do not check their legal rights at the door
when they enter, even when they enter through the
emergency department. Catherine should have been
allowed to leave the hospital because she was competent. In contrast, when Catherine’s brother and fiancé
brought her unconscious to the emergency department, the physicians there could (and did) properly
treat her on the authorization of these persons. The
only time emergency department physicians should
not treat an unconscious patient is if the physicians
know that the patient would not accept a particular
treatment even if it was thought to be necessary to
prevent death. This point would be difficult to prove,
but if Catherine either had had a prior relationship
with the physician or had completed an advance directive forbidding intubation under such circumstances, then her directive would have been legally decisive, not the wishes of her family.
The overarching general rule is that informed consent is required before physicians can lawfully treat
competent adult patients, all of whom have the right
to refuse any medical treatment.13,16-21 Patients who
consent to interventions such as surgery, of course,
agree to the reasonable use of drugs and physical
restraints during surgery and postoperatively while
they are disoriented. But in most other circumstances, few competent patients would agree to be restrained. Insofar as they continue the move away from
paternalism to the protection of patients and their
rights, the new HCFA regulations are to be applauded. However, the absence of a clear statement that
they apply only to incompetent patients leaves the
regulations open to potentially dangerous misinterpretation. And to the extent that they make the use
of restraints seem legitimate and medically appropriate in some settings, they fall short of conveying
the message that restraints should be used only as a
last resort.
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